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0 Two years ago, a news agency reported fran Washington that a large map 
of Southeast Asia had been discovered lying derelict in a little-used corner 
of the Pentagon. The map was labelled "surplus," the report added. The 
symbolic significance of that situation applied far beyond the United States. 
It seemed to strengthen the growing conviction that the West, which had indeed 
"defined" the region - when the Allied Southeast Asia Corm1and was formed at 
Quebec in August 1943 - now considered Southeast Asia a "surplus 11 area that 
could, or perhaps should, be subjected to a period of neglect. 
That was a remarkable turn of events for a region whose history is very 
largely a record of exposure to and control by external influences. From 1511, 
when the Iberian vanguard established a Western presence in Malacca, until very 
recently, Western Pov1ers exercised pre-eminent influence in Southeast Asia. They 
Q divided the region into· spheres of colonial rule, .superimposed a veneer of 
Christianisation on previously Sini~ised or Indianised lands, and propelled 
the region towards industrial modernisation. Recent exceptions to this pattern 
were the temporary establishment of a so-called Sphere of Greater Co-Prosperity 
by Japan, and Nortl1 Vietnam's decisive rejection of a return to Western colonial 
rule after World War II. 
Stirrings of nationalistic and revolutionary fervour were felt in neighboring 
lands after the Second World War, but Western rule or influence returned to most 
of the area that now comprises the five-member Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (Asean) - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Western influence lingered in a variety of forms and in many fields of activity, 










Four of the five Asean countries were offered the comfort of possible 
protection by and assistance fron1 supervening Western powers. The incentive 
to think and act regionally in that context was minimal. So it is hardly 
surprising that many earlier attempts to set up regional organisations were 
abortive. Asean itself \vas greeted at its birth on /\ug. 8, 1967 with some 
doubt about its mortality. 
There have been occasions when those doubts seemed j.ustified. The rate 
at which recommendations made by Asean's planners were implanented has been 
notoriously slow. None at all were seen through from proposal to action in 
Asean's first year, and the implrn1entation rate took all of seven years to 
rise to 25 per cent. At the same time many causes of intra-Asean conflict 
persisted. Th~ Filipino claim to Sabah, in Malaysia, was not dropped. The 
Philippines has alleged, too, that rebels in the southern Philippines were 
supported and supplied by Sabah. Clandestine activity on the Thai-Malaysia 
border by members of the Malayan Communist Party, and by Thailand's Muslim 
secessionists has sometimes resulted in friction between those two countries. 
An undercurrent of mutual suspicion was noted from time to time in relations 
between Indonesia and Singapore. In fact, Asean 1 s survival is in itself an 
~chievernent that counterbalances the organisation's relatively slow pace of 
action. Asean 1 s leaders like to point out that there have been moments of 
indecision or a lack of unanimity even within the European Economic Community 
and Cornecon. 
Today, there appears to be a strong regional sense in Asean countries. 
Asean tourism, Asean trade fairs, Asean publications, Asean studies and, of 
course 9 the Asean summit at Gali, are all manifestations of this feeling. In 
the words of Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam: " .•.. Asean ideas 
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and techniques have .... permeated national frontiers and national thinking .... 
0 Nowhere else in Asia today is there a coherent regional organisation like ' 
0 
0 
Asean .... 11 
Asean's validity and viability as a regional organisation have been 
recognised by Australia, the European Economic Community, Japan and, more 
.recently, by Canada. Asean 1 s survival and its emergence as a potential 
instrument of regional policy rather than a fashion~ble doctrine can be 
traced in large measure to the rethinking that took place in Asean's capitals 
against the background of dwindling Western involvement in Southeast Asia. 
A region considered 11 surplus 11 must necessarily feel impelled to draw sustenance 
from within itself. 
Consider these juxtapositions of cause and effect. In November 1967, 
Britain said it vJOuld 11 \'vithdraw altogether 11 from its bases in Singapore and 
Malaysia by 1971. Two months after Mr. Harold Wilson's announcement, Tun Dr. Ismail, 
who was to serve later as his country's Deputy Prime Minister, told Malaysia's 
National Assembly that the time was ripe for Southeast nations to adcipt policies 
of neutrality and peaceful co-existence, pledging themselves not to interfere 
in the internal ~ffairs of tither countries, and stating their will.ingness to 
accept whatever form of government another country chose to adopt. 
In July 1969, Mr. Richard Nixon announced what was later to be known as 
the Guam Doctrine, v,1hich implied that the messianic period of American involvement 
on the Southeast Asian mainland would be phased o~t. In April 1970, Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafi urged the preparatory meeting in Dar-es-Salaam for the Lusaka 
summit meeting of non-aligned nations to seek the neutralization of Indo-China 
and the·whole of Southeast Asia under guarantees from China, the Soviet Union 
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and the United States. The next year, on November 27, 1971, Asean 1 s Foreign 
0 Ministers, meeting in Kuala Lumpur, formJlly declared that t.he neutralizatlon 
of Southeast /\sia was 11 a desirable olJjcctive 11 and agreed to 11 explorc ways and 
means of bringing about its realisation." 
The Washington-Hanoi Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam was signed on January 27, 1973. Shortly thereafter President Marcos 
of the Philippines suggested that an /\sian Forum, attended by ill Asian heads 
of government, be convened, to discuss the 11 full implications of the peace in 
Vietnam. 11 Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo placed this proposal before Asean 1 s 
Foreign Ministers at their Kuala Lumpur meeting in February. The practicability 
of the proposal was questioned, and the minisiers finally resolved that such 
a conference should be held "at an appropriate time. 11 That agreement was 
reconfirmed by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Pattaya, Thailand, 
0 one year later. 
By mid-1975, the American presence in Inda-China had been abruptly 
dismantled. Towards the end of that year, official sources in Jakarta quietly 
and informally proposed to their Asean colleagues that the organisation should 
aim for an Asean summit at which heads-of-government could assess the region's 
political and economic situation, and set out guidelines fo~ a new phase of 
active regional co-operation. Bali, famed among tourist promoters and seekers 
after an undefined "eastern mystique 11 alike, was suggested as a suitable site. 
Intense diplomatic interchanges in Asean capitals followed, and it was during 
·the funeral ceremonies in Ku·ala Lumpur for Tun Abdul Razak, the late Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, that agreement was finally reached - at a series of 
hotel-room consultations among Asean leaders who were in Malaysia for the 
0 obsequies. 
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Thus~ almost nine years after Asean was formed, the stage was set for 
the association's first summit meeting. For Asean 1 s leaders, the road to , 
.0 Bali Wi:ls strenuous. They had barely emerged from such divisive episodes as 
.Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, and Singapore 1 s separation from the 






diffidence. In the intervening years they faced such traumatic experiences 
as the British withdrawal from the region; new directions in international 




and practices were based; threats to domestic stability; international 
economic trends such as a fourfold increase in oil prices, and the bizarre 
combination of worldwide inflation and recession that upset their own economic 
calculations. Asean's leaders like to call themselves "pragmatic," and it is 
a measure of.their pragmatism that faced with difficulties and the need for 
adaptation to a range of new realities, they decided to approach these tasks 
firmly and in union; to get on top of the situation and not just be influenced 
by it. The emphasis at Bali, it was hoped, would be on jayadiri standing 
on one 1 s own feet. 
The Bali summit meeting took place on February 23 and 24, 1976, under 
the chairmanship of President Suharto, the host-country's head-of-government. 
Other participating heads-of-government were welcomed with formal ceremonies 
reserved in Indonesia's history for the triumphant homecoming of victorious 
warriors. The mood prevailing was euphoric, according to all reporters 
covering the event, and the heady spirit of great expectations was captured 
by Thailand's then Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj 1t1ho said: "The beauty and 
serenity of Bali should inspire confidence. In Paradise, one never fails, 




the summit meeting came close to collapse. That it did not, was partly the 
0 result of a capacity for compromise that has gradually developed in intra-l\sean 
relations, and partly an indication that Asean 1 s leaders were committed to 
making a success of their meeting, giving regional co-operation a new momentum. 
11 Healthy argument on ways and means to our agreed goals is a sign of vigorous 
life in Asean,' 1 coITTllented Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, whose 
suggestion that the summit should approve an across-the-board 10 per cent 
tariff cut in intra-Asean trade raised vigorous objections from Indonesia. 
11 It is the role of heads of government to demolish the barriers of distrust 
and suspicion between our states, 11 said President Marcos of the Philippines 
whose proposal for setting up machinery for compulsory, automatic arbitration 
of intra-Asean disputes was hotly resented by Malaysia. 
It is interesting that these differences did not actually surface at 




stated at meetings of officials who had, in fact, sp~nt three painstaking 
months preparing draft documents for signing. When disputes could not be 
resolved at that level, they were submitted to the Foreign Ministers who 
accompanied their heads-of-government to Bali. ~Jhen the Foreign Ministers 
could not settle an issue, they referred the problem to the heads-of-government 
concerned who talked things over on pleasant golf course fairways, or during 
an informal visit at one of the ritzy tourist cottages in which Indonesia 
housed its guests. When heads-of-gnvernment met in formal session, they could 
indulge in grand eloquence, ceremoniously sign the documents placed before 
them~ and generally conduct themselves in a spirit of manifest goodwill. This 
intricate and perhaps cumberson~ procedure is considered the typically Asean 




\'Jhose staterTJt·r,i·; and commitments in a flash of anger would,. by virtue of their 
office, renw1r, irrevocable. 
. 
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, could slug it out 
verbally in U"' knov1le.dge that they were not speaking for themselves, and simner 
dovm over be: 1:r ·ind satay when it was all over. 
The Bali "'rnmit did not give harrassed headline writers in Ascan' s capitals 
and elsewhere· 1111.~ convenience of a 11 breakthrough. 11 It did not produce decisions' 
that turn poiril" or make epochs in human history. It did not satisfy Asean's 
economic man;1•1 1 ·1:s who had hoped that the ground would be laid at the summit, 
beginning wiu, n 10 per cent tariff cut, for free trade arrangements. It did 
not satisfy r 1•11iunal political commentators and others v1ho had hoped for dramatic 
announcement'.; '111 matters such as security, mutual defence, and pol i ti cal stability. 
On the other l1o111d, the summit meeting did not come apart at the seams. Deliberations, 
wherever they v11-re held, were conducted in a spirit of give-and-take, resulting 
Q in musjawara, 111· consensus, the region's traditional technique of political 
decision-makir111. Hongkong's Far Eastern Economic Review described the Bali 
meeting as a "·.i1btle success. 11 Singapore's Straits Times said that as a result 
of the meetiw1 /\sean has 11 taken on some flesh and sinev1. 11 The documents signed 
0 
at Bali were 11 1111ique 11 and "would make further progress in achieving Asean's 
goals possiblt"" said Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein at the summit's 
closing ceremo11y. The results of the Bali meetingo President Suharto added, 
were "further 111·cof11 of Asean's 11 determination to chart (its) own future, and 
not let undesi1-.1bie external factors interfere in the soluti.on of (its) problems. 11 
The diplrn11.\tic equipment v.Jith v1hich Asean's leaders armed themselves for 
the long journ1·y 0n the road from Bali were a Declaration of Asean Concord, 
a Treaty of Amit\· and Co-operation, and a Joint CommunifJuc. There is some 









el<~lllcnt of overlap in these three documents, but they must be considered as 
a whole, because read together they constitute a new Asean Charter. The B~li 
documents in effect replace the Bangkok Charter of August 1967 as the rulebook 
for Asean's activities from now on. 
Five keynote areas of decision emerge from the Bali documents: 
l!)_~;-~ituti ona l strengthe~, I ntra-Asean Conciliation, Economic Co-opera ti on, 
?ol"itical Stabili!Y_, and Peaceful Extra-Asean Relations. The decisions taken 
under these headings provide Asean with a number of goals for the future. Some 
of those objectives are limited but, overall, more substantive than those set 
out in the very general terms of the Bangkok Charter. 
Asean 1 s heads-of-government formally agreed to establish an Asean Secretariat 
in Jakarta, headed by a Secretary General, Lieutenant-General Dharsono of 
Indonesia. The task of co-ordinating Asean 1 s activities will henceforth fall 
on Gen. Dharsono and his regionally-recruited staff. Centralised management of 
Asean's endeavours will replace, and presumably be mo~e effective than, the 
loose system of consultation hitherto carried out by 11 Permanent Committees and 
five special committees. 
The Bali documents require that each member of Asean should not conduct 
it~elf in any manner or participate in any activity that would threaten the 
territorial integrity of a fello11-member, or members. Should that commitment 
be broken, however, the dispute could go to a ministerial High Council, called 
into "continuing session" and empm-.iered to recorrmend "appropriate means of 
settlement" including "good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. 11 • 




Undoubtedly, these provisions create a less. than perfect legal framework 
within which disputes might be resolved. The procedure suffers from the 
exclusion of automatic arbitration - proposed by the Philippines - and makes 
no mention of 11 sanctlons 11 or other appropriate correctives that could be applied 
to settle intra-regional disputes swiftly. But a system of voluntary arbitration 
represented the closest possible convergence of contending views, and the 
compromise is backed by the unanimous support it received at Bali. Had tough 
conciliation measures been adopted and subsequently proved unenforceable, they 
would hardly have been worth the paper on which they were written. As Oatuk 
Hussein Onn, the strongest opponent of compulsory arbitration, said: 11 It would 
have been easy to reach blind but meaningless agreements. 11 The procedure 
adopted has vision - vision born of commitment to conciliation and unity, even 
if it does lack muscle. 
Q At pre-surrm1it mee~ings, Asean 1 s Foreign Ministers and officials.had agreed 
0 
11 in principle 11 that a free trade zone would be a highly desirable ·objective. At 
Bali, this approach to regional economic co-operation was actively pushed by 
Singapore and the Philippines -- and, resolutely resisted by Indonesia. 1he 
Indonesian view was that free trade arrangements would benefit members unequally 
unless they were institute.d only after the five Asean countries had all reached 
compatible levels of industrialisation. The Bali documents restated free trade 
as a long-term objective. For the inrnediate future, Asean would adopt 11 appropriate 
regional strategies 11 in such areas as mutual assistance to obtain a regular flow 
of basic commodities, particularly food and energy; co-operation in trade and 
exchange dealings; and the pursuit of joint ~fforts to secure advantageous terms 
in the world's market places and from international trading or economic 
institutions. 




It was also agreed ~t Bali that future economic co-operation should be 
Ci guided, as far as practiuible, by the United Nations report on "Economic 
Co-operation for Asean," prepared at Asean's request some five years ago. For 
0 
instance, in naming ind~:trial projects that could be established under 
complementarity-arrang~r~nts or package deals, the Bali documents virtually 
repeated the UN report': list -- urea, superphosphates, potash, p~trochemicals, 
steel, soda ash, newsprint and rubber products. 
The responsibility for giving tangible forn1 to the various economic 
proposals made and principles outlined at Bali was vested in Asean's Economic 
Ministers. Although Asean was founded as an instrument of economic rather 
than political co-operation, the highest previous contc;cts were made by Foreign 
Ministers who met annually to consider a formal agenda of economic affairs. 
During the last few years, the Foreign Ministers also discussed common political 
interests, but informally, and after the official economic agenda had been 
completed. To keep the distinction clear, the Foreign Ministers' review of 
economic issues was summarised in a Joint Communique; their political discussions 
were the subject of a press release. While this arrangement served to underscore 
Asean's interest in economic co-operation, the discussions of regional economic 
issues were unfortunately not h~ld by Ministers empowered to act on the 
conclusions when they got home. This was a serious defect, and has now been 
corrected.· Meetings of Asean'~ Economic Ministers will be held ''regularly or 
as deemed necessary," placing responsibility for economic action where it 
properly belongs. 
The first such meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on March 8 and 9, 
hard on the heels of the Bali summit. The Ministers resolved that four types 
Q of medium-sized industry should be undertaken: urea in Indonesia and Malaysia~ 
diesel engines in Singapore, soda ash in Thai 1 and. and superphospha tes in the 
... /11 
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Philippines. Not surprisingly, non-government groups hu ve been qui ck to sense 
O and follow the official attitude. Aseun bunkers meeting in Singapore last· 
August decided to try for un /\sean Clearing Union. Similar co-operation is 
0 
0 
expected among shippers, traders, und industrialists. Plans for an /\sean 
Development Journal are underway. Meanwhile, scientists and other res~arch 
personnel will continue their linked efforts in such fields as housing, 
post-harvest technology, and family planning. 
In another area, fairly firm links have been forged down the years by 
the security and intelligence organisations of Asean countries. Malaysia and 
Indonesia have for several years conducted successful joint security operations 
in Kalimantan. A Malaysian newspaper editor detained in Kuala Lumpur some months 
ago on charges of conruunist subversion was arrested partly as a result of 
evidence said to have been obtained during one of his visits to Indonesia. 
A Briton suspected of complicity in a plot to assassinate President Marcos 
was jailed in Singapore. Co-operation between Thai and Malaysian security 
forces on their joint border is tricky, perhaps because Thai officials are more 
concerned about the activity of Muslim secessionists thin with tracking down 
me~bers of the Malayan Communist Party who return to jungle redoubts in Thailand 
after their forays in Malaysia. A Thai-Malaysian border security agreement 
broke down some \'leeks after the Bali summit on .the issue of 11 hot pursuit 11 but 
border security operations continue. 
All these arrangements take place outside the ambit of Asean, and security 
and intelligence personnel h6ve privately stated their conviction that political 
stability could be best ensured by a formal joint agreement -- in other words, 
a defence pact. This attitude to security and stability has been resisted by 
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Asean 1 s leaders, notably by President Suharto. At Bali Asean 1 s leaders 
0 reconfirri1ed their view. They agreed, too, that the way to security lies nbt 
only through counterinsurgency operations but also in sustained attempts to 
0 
reduce, if not eliminate, economic and social conditions in which insurgent 
movements thrive. 
Security sweeps will undoubtedly continue. Domestic anti-communism is 
sometimes phobic in Asean's capitals. Domestic politic,s is not expected to 
intrude into external relations, however~ Asean's member-governments have 
learned to separate domestic considerations from the imperatives of foreign 
policy. So, while counterinsurgency and security operations continue at home, 
Asean's members are expected to continue with their efforts, jointly and 
separately, to strengthen or improve relations with China and Vietnam. 
By stating that membership in Asean would be open to other states in South-
east Asai, and by reinvoking the association's Declaration of Neutrality, the 
Bali summit sought to convince both neighbours and distant powers that Asean 
1t1ishes to be at peace with them all. The goal of establishing a "Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 11 in the Asean area cannot, of course, be reached 
without ·the agreement of the world's major powers. Future relations with the 
states of Inda-China, meanwhile, cannot be assessed with any degree of certainty. 
The states of Inda-China have responded to soundings made separately by Asean's 
member-states but have beeh less than enthusiastic about joint Asean approaches. 
These included last year's proposal by Asean that all its members, on the one 
·side, and Kampuchea on the other, should normalise relations simultaneously; 
and Asean's offers to participate in the reconstruction of Vietnam. 
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On the eve of the [lali sunnnit, Nortl1 Vietni1m charged that the meeting 
was mounted by the US as "part of its schemes of intervention and aggrcssiDn" 
against the countries of Inda-China. /\fter the summit meeting, Hanoi said 
that "the time is very good for the struggle of Southeast /\sian peoples, 11 
and described a.revolutionary course in the region as being 11 in line with 
the law of the evolution of history. 11 No 11 reactionary force" could thwart the 
11 struggle, 11 \'lhich was "fully supported 11 by the Vietnamese people. Asean 1 s 
reaction was to stress its own indestructibility. 
At the conference of nonaligned heads of state and government held in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka last August, the Vietnamese delegation had opposed acceptance 
of the Asean Declaration at Colombo only because Asean had adopted the declaration 
at a time \vhen some members of the association 11 were directly or indirectly 
serving 'the US aggressive war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in complete 
contravenfi on of the pri nci pl es of the non a 1 i gned movement. 11 Hanoi apparently 
is not fully convinced about Asean 1 s good faith. Asean's leaders, living as 
they do so close to Vietnam, no doubt remember somewhat uneasily that Japan's 
air assault on Kata Bharu in Malaysia, which preceded Japan's occupation of 
then Malaya and Singapore, was launched from a Japanese airbase in southern 
Vietnam. So Hanoi and Asean are going to watch each other closely - and that 
certainly will be an interesting process to observe in the post-Bali years. 
One can look at the Bali documents as relatively light equipment for 
Asean's leaders on the road from Bali; short on detail, long on political 
and economic philosophy. One can, conversely, see them as suited to their 
purpose because they were not pushed through by a truculent majority, but 
accepted by consensus. One can, moreover, argue that it is wise to travel 
light: unnecessary equipment can be discarded and replaced with suitable 












substitutes. It is useful to remember, too, that there is nothing in any 
document that makes a document work, as Henry Kissinger once said in unothcr 
~ context. 11 /i document 1-1orks only becuuse the par ti es concerned intend to 
implement it and, therefore, all it can do is to prescribe what the 
obligations of the variou.s, parties are .... 11 The words that came fron; Cali 
are on record. NovJ it is the performance of the par ti ci pants, and the 
consequences of their performunce, that count. 
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